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Four slows 
The fast/slow distinction in the call for papers reminds us of the contrast 
Lévi-Strauss ([1962] 1966) made between ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ societies.  For him 
and for many others, the Western, European-American worlds are 
characteristically ‘hot’, in that they valorise ‘progress’ and radical change.  In 
such societies, technology is celebrated as a primary motor of progress and 
change; it is the ‘fuel’ that keeps the ‘hot’ society motoring.   In contrast, so-
called ‘primitive’ societies are ‘cold’, being steeped in a mythic mode of 
thinking that suppresses time, creating an unwillingness to change long-
standing traditions.  This hot-cold distinction provides us with a frame for 
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unpacking slowness.  We use it to identify four separate but related 
understandings of slowness which we will explore in the paper: rejection, 
antidote, symptomatic and deconstruction of the hot.   
First, slow can be understood as a rejection of the hot.  Slow, in this 
sense, is a repudiation of modernity’s valorisation of progress, it’s optimistic 
take on change, and its celebration of technology.  Slow, then, is a return to 
older ways, and usually revolves around re-instituting a romanticised vision of 
traditional, ‘colder’ societies.  Simply put, if hot is bad and cold is good, then 
slowness will make us ‘colder’ and thus better.   We see this form of slowness 
in, for example, the exaltation and restoration of traditional farming practices, 
and in neo-luddite and technophobia communities that reject modernity and 
new technology.   Within this paradigm, slowness represents a hostility to 
modernity, which is always understood negatively.  The intellectual tradition 
feeding this perspective includes Thoreau’s Walden (1854/2007), the writings 
of Jean-Jacques Rousseau,  Schumacher’s Small is Beautiful (1973), and 
Ivan Illich’s critiques of western medicine and schooling (Illich, 1971; 1976). 
Second, one can understand slowness as an antidote to the hot. More 
precisely, slowness is a way of tempering the excesses of modernity, rather 
than a rejection of, modernity per se.  While various forms of slowness are 
advocated, this is done through judiciously integrating slowness within 
modernity, which is still understood positively.  In this respect, the emergence 
of ‘slowness’ as a philosophy of living in the contemporary world might be 
interpreted as a ‘cooling down’ of modernity, or as an antidote of sorts to the 
gushing world of postmodernity, liquid modernity, hyper-modernity, hyper-
consumerism, reflexive modernity and the like. Thus, slowness as antidote 
seeks to mitigate the collateral damage caused by a high-speed society. 
Typical of this position is Honoré’s In Praise of Slowness, which, while 
praising slowness, is far from antagonistic to modernity as the author clarifies 
in this early statement: “Before we go any further, let’s make one thing clear: 
this book is not a declaration of war against speed.  Speed has helped to 
remake our world in ways that are wonderful and liberating.  Who wants to live 
without the Internet or jet travel?” (Honoré, 2004: 4).    
A third take on slowness is that it is symptomatic of the hot.  If hyper-
modernity is about radical and rapid change, then a quick deceleration from 
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very fast to very slow is about as rapid and as radical a change as one can 
get.  Thus, we can expect a book called Slower to be published in the near 
future - coming to an outlet near you, right now! - as an alternative to Gleick’s 
best-selling Faster (1999).  And if, as Lipovetsky (2006) argues, fashion has 
replaced metaphysics, then ‘slow’ is perhaps best understood as just the 
latest fashion.  If individual consumers want to consume slowly (or slowness), 
well then the usual marketing machinery can be mobilised to effect this, just 
as with any fashion item.  Indeed, teaching cases on the marketing of slow 
food are probably already in development (and if they aren’t, they will be, 
soon!).   
The fourth perspective on slowness, and this is the perspective that we 
will most develop in our full paper, is that the slow modus best represents the 
deconstruction of the hot.  In our first three modes, the slow rhetoric takes as 
a given that the contemporary western world is speeding up, and it is this 
empirical reality that provides the foundation for both the rhetoric of slowness 
and particular ‘slow’ practices (e.g. slow food, medicine and the like).  In other 
words, slow is a derivative and hence secondary concept that both pits itself 
against and feeds off the hegemony of speed.  Slow, then, can have no 
existence without fast, which, of necessity, is depicted as primary. However, 
another approach - our fourth slow -  is to recognise that the slow modus is 
symptomatic, not of the hot, but of an attack on the assumption that 
contemporary modernity is liquid, hyper hot, and moving faster than ever 
before.  In other words, slow is a manifestation of what we refer to as an 
inertia movement.   What is curious about the empirical movement to inertia is 
that it is paradoxically coincidental with gushing talk about speed and velocity.  
Thus, we refer to this phenomenon as accelerating to inertia, which we will 
explore in the latter part of the paper.     
 
Accelerating to Inertia 
But let’s slow down a bit first, since talk about speed, rapid change, and 
acceleration can lead us to forget how problematic these terms can be.  Two 
issues complicate any analysis of change and related concepts such as ‘fast’ 
or ‘slow’.  First, there is the ontological question of whether change is a 
derivative or primary phenomenon.  While the commonsensical view is that 
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entities exist and change over time (and we can somehow measure this 
change and label it as ‘fast’ or ‘slow’) an alternative perspective is that change 
is primordial and that ‘entities’ are nothing but our (conceited) attempt to mark 
rather arbitrary boundaries in a world of flux.  This latter approach goes back 
at least as far as Heraclitus (540 - 480 BC) who made the well-known 
observation that one cannot step in the same river twice and that “nothing 
endures but change”.   A second issue is epistemological, and is concerned 
with how we can know that the world is changing at a ‘fast’ or ‘slow’ pace.  
What could these terms mean, since measures of speed (and slowness) 
necessarily have relative rather than absolute meaning? Quite clearly, what is 
‘radical’ or ‘rapid’ change for one person may be inconsequential for another.  
Most of the talk about change ignores these ontological and epistemological 
issues and considers change as an objective rather than subjective 
phenomenon.  We talk about economic change, social change, technological 
change as objective, independent phenomena and gloss over the reality that 
each individual experiences change in a profoundly personal way. And once 
‘change’ is detached from subjective experience it floats off into its own 
independent existence where, ironically, it is invariant.  A third issue relates to 
the difference between actual change and talk about change, or the difference 
between the reality and rhetoric of change.  If we accept Thomas’s theorem -- 
“If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences” (Thomas 
and Janowitz, 1966: 301)  -- then, by extension, if we all say that our current 
world is rapidly changing then it is rapidly changing.  The rhetoric becomes 
the reality.  But while we recognise the power of Thomas’s theorem, we argue 
that it doesn’t necessarily have to be so (it’s a theorem, not a fact).  
Specifically, in relation to talk about speed, we assert that there is now a quite 
massive disconnect between the reality and the rhetoric, between the walk 
and the talk.  In the remainder of the paper we will develop our thesis, arguing 
that the talk about change (the rhetoric) is accelerating, but that the reality is 
that, relative to previous eras, our time is one of relative stasis (or inertia).  To 
make this argument means that we are perhaps falling into the ontological 
and epistemological traps we have already identified, and maybe such traps 
are unavoidable.  To address the issue somewhat, we circumscribe our 
argument by stressing that we are broadly speaking about those living in the 
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developed western world, most specifically the United States of America. And 
of course, even in this region we recognize that the empirical reality of 
particular places and individuals will be at variance with our overall thesis.   
Let us begin with the talk.   There is no shortage of proclamations about 
how things are changing rapidly today -- faster than ever before (Kurzweil, 
2001; 2005; Virilio, 2006).  For example, Tom Peters, the uber-guru of 
management, has made a lucrative career out of publishing books with titles 
like  Re-imagine! Business excellence in a disruptive age (2003), Thriving on 
chaos (1987), and Liberation management: necessary disorganization for the 
nanosecond nineties (1992), and producing quotable quotes like “We pursue 
preservation. But the old order is doomed. We value permanence. But 
“permanence” is the last refuge of those with shriveled imaginations. We 
practice change. But “change” is not enough. (Not nearly)” (Peters, 2003: 30).  
Bill Gates feeds in the same trough, as he peppers his book, Business @ the 
Speed of Thought: Succeeding in the Digital Economy (Gates, 2000), with 
sentences like the following: “If the 1980s were about quality and the 1990s 
were about reengineering, then the 2000s will be about velocity. About how 
quickly the nature of business will change.”  What is interesting about such 
claims is that, first, they tend to be made by those in positions of power; 
second, they are rarely supported by empirical evidence; and third, they skip 
over the epistemological issue of how one could possibly measure and 
compare social change across time and place.  Everyone knows that the 
world is rapidly changing, so why the need for evidence? 
We have collected some evidence, not about speed per se, but about 
talk about speed.  To get a handle on this, we counted how often the words 
‘fast’, ‘speed’, ‘acceleration’, ‘rapid’, and ‘quick’ (and variants of these words) 
were present in the citation and/or abstract of publications extracted in the 
ProQuest database (which includes ABI/Inform, Dissertations & Theses, and 
ProQuest Newspapers) since 1920.  While this is an indiscriminate search, 
the prevalence of these words does indicate the extent to which speed is 
infused within the rhetoric of a particular time period. The solid bold line in 
Figure 1 shows a count of these words in the database in 5-year periods (the 
actual count is adjusted by multiplying the count of articles identified in each 
5-year period by an adjustment factor, namely the ratio between the total 
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number of articles indexed in 2004-9 and the total number of articles indexed 
in the 5-year period).  What this shows quite dramatically is how talk was 
relatively ‘slow’ from 1920 to 1975, but that talk became alarmingly ‘fast’ after 
1975.  One possible explanation for this shift is that it reflects changes over 
time in the type of publication that makes up the ProQuest database.  For 
instance, trade publications accounted for only 5% to 12% of all publications 
in the database up to 1975, but this increased rapidly at that time, and since 
1990 such publications account for over 40% of the database (see Figure 2).  
Moreover, these trade publications tend to engage in ‘fast talk’ much more 
than other media, as illustrated in Figure 3.  However, even when these are 
excluded (see Figure 1), the major step change in the rhetoric is still evident 
during the 1970s and, importantly, the ‘fast talk’ has continued since then. 
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Figure 1.  Fast Talk and Change Talk in the ProQuest Database 
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Proquest Database Structure
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Figure 2.  The changing structure of the ProQuest Database. 
Adjusted Speed Count by Category
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Figure 3.  Fast Talk by media category. 
 
In 1962, Thomas Kuhn wrote his classic study of scientific revolutions 
and he was the first to coin the term ‘paradigm shift’.  The popularisation of 
the phrase and Kuhn’s book since the 1980s is perhaps symptomatic of the 
move to ‘fast talk’ in the last 30 years or so.   The curious phenomenon is that 
while the phrase is now a grossly overused buzzword (Google found 2.2 
million instances of the term in May 2010, while cnet has listed it as one of the 
top 10 buzzwords of the digital age -- http://www.cnet.com/1990-11136_1-
6275610-1.html), Figure 1 does depict one clear instance of a paradigm shift. 
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It shows that a few years in the late 1970s marked a rapid transition from a 
‘slow’ discourse, where fast talk was not prevalent, to a ‘fast’ discourse 
characterised by a high incidence of speedy language.   What happened 
between 1975 and 1980 to account for this paradigm shift?  A number of 
possible explanations warrant consideration.  First, the step change may be 
linked to relatively steep rises in the US consumer price index during the 
1970s (from 3.2% in 1972 to 11% in 1975 and from 6.5% in 1977 to 13.5% in 
1980 (source US Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics).  That said, 
the US inflation rate during the last quarter of the twentieth century was 
unremarkable in the context of the inflation rate over the past 100 years 
(Figure 4) and indeed the relatively stable and low inflation rate since 1984 
contrasts starkly with the very high levels of inflation and deflation that 
characterised the period from 1910 to 1960. Moreover, the speed rhetoric 
continued apace after 1984 even though this period had low and relatively 
stable inflation, which suggests that we should attribute the paradigm shift to 
the particular economic circumstances of the late 1970s.    
 
Figure 4.  US Inflation Rate 1910-2010. 
 
One potential link between inflation and change does, however, tie in 
with this dateline. In 1965, Ian Macleod coined the term stagflation, linking for 
the first time in populist rhetoric inflation and stagnation – previously held 
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theoretically distinct under prevailing Keynesian economic thought. The 
linking of the two, most notably promulgated by Friedman, swiftly became part 
of the Conservative and Republican economic orthodoxy, whether the solution 
was seen through supply-side theory or control of the money supply. Although 
inflation was not at historically surprising levels in the US, the connection with 
stagnation may arguably suggest that any diminution in inflation would also be 
seen as a move away from stagnation – hence acceleration!  
However, if, as Karl Weick and others have argued, sense-making is a 
retrospective activity, then the surge in fast talk that occured around 1975 
may be because rapid change has to be experienced before it could be made 
sense of, recognised, labeled, described and analysed.  In other words, talk 
about rapid change probably reflects prior rather than contemporary 
experiences of the phenomenon.  Hence, the changes of the 1960s and early 
1970s may have only been articulated years or even decades later.  Allied to 
this, it is clear that analysis of social, technological or economic change 
requires substantial comparative data across time, and that some temporal 
distance is required to see trends in social change and to dismiss outliers.  
More precisely, maybe there was significant discussion about ‘change’ in the 
1960s, but written comment on the rate of that change -- which is reflected in 
our search for terms like ‘speed’, ‘rapid’, ‘accelerate’, ‘quick’ and ‘fast’ --  only 
developed subsequently.  To investigate this we counted the number of 
documents with the words ‘change’, ‘changes’, or ‘changed’ in the ProQuest 
database, which produced the dashed line in Figure 1. What is notable about 
this is how similar the ‘change’ and the ‘speed’ graphs are, with the rise in the 
former only preceding the latter by a few years. Moreover, it seems that while 
many might now feel that Bob Dylan’s The Times They Are a-Changing 
captured the spirit of the social and political upheaval of the 1960s, this sense 
of upheaval does not seem to have been reflected in the printed discourse of 
that time.   
Technological advances provides another perspective on the issue.  The 
impact of a new technology can only be properly recognised, described and 
analysed once the technology has become well established, if not ubiquitous, 
and there can be a long gap between the invention of a technology, its mass 
use, and analysis of its effect and impact.  For instance, even though the 
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television was invented in 1923, it was 1970 before this technology had 
reached saturation level (in this year 95% of US households had a television 
and the US census stopped collecting this data).  Likewise, even though the 
gasoline-powered automobile was invented in 1885 it took a century for this 
technology to saturate the market (as measured by the number of cars per 
capita, which rose from 0.08 in 1920 to a peak of 0.54 in 1980 dropping to 
0.48 in 2000).  Thus, maybe the paradigm shift in the late 1970s was 
because, while a myriad of new technologies were diffusing within the US 
during the first half of the twentieth century, it wasn’t until then that the 
changes (partly) brought about by these technologies could be recognised 
and described. Perhaps.        
In terms of the infusion of ‘fast talk’, it is hard to overstate the impact of 
the space programme, especially the Apollo programme that ran from 1961 to 
1975, because it required such a sudden and public burst of technological 
creativity on a large scale, and because speed and acceleration were so 
central to the discourse of space travel.  In addition, photographs of the Earth 
from space, especially the ‘Blue Marble’ photograph from 1972, presented a 
radically new image of our world as fragile and isolated, which at once 
inspired (or panicked into action) the environmental movement and advocates 
of greater technological change. 
A full explanation for the paradigm shift that occured in the late 1970s 
would require a forensic analysis beyond the scope of this study, but it seems 
clear that a shift in the discourse did occur and has been maintained up to the 
present.  In so far as the world is constituted through language, then our 
analysis of the ProQuest database suggests that the last quarter of the 
twentieth century was radically faster than the first 75 years.  However, an 
alternative and more compelling explanation is that ‘fast talk’ became 
fashionable around 1975 and that this snowballed as commentators, 
academics, practitioners and Joe Soap jumped on a self-referencing and 
accelerating bandwagon.  For example, in 1969 Neil Postman wrote his 
influential book, Teaching as a Subversive Activity, in which he observed that 
“It is the thesis of this book that change -- constant, accelerating, ubiquitous -- 
is the most striking characteristic of the world we live in” (Postman and 
Weingartner, 1969: 13).  It seems likely that this and similar comments of the 
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time colaesced, and, once a tipping point was reached, it became a ‘social 
epidemic’ (Gladwell, 2002).   Tom Wolfe (1975) makes a similar observation 
in his acerbic study of fashion in the art world, where a small clique or 
cénacles can set a trend that, in turn, is taken up by the bohemian world, the 
art world, and ultimately tout le monde.  The power of fashion and bandwagon 
effects is also recognised in the management literature (Abrahamson and 
Rosenkopf, 1993; Abrahamson, 1996; Abrahamson and Eisenman, 2001), as 
is their potential to create speculative bubbles, irrational exuberance, and 
groupthink.  As Charles Mackay put it in his classic study of mass delusions, 
"Men, it has been well said, think in herds; it will be seen that they go mad in 
herds, while they only recover their senses slowly, and one by one." (Mackay, 
1841/2003: viii).  Slowly indeed. 
Figure 1 shows that the rhetoric of change and speed --  what we refer to 
as ‘fast talk’ -- has continued apace since about 1975, to the point where we 
can now interpret it as a ‘fetish’ (Grey, 2003).  This is interesting because if 
the present is depicted as speeding faster than the recent past, and that was 
speeding faster than the more distant past, then we can talk not only about a 
rhetoric of speed, but a rhetoric of acceleration (as in ever increasing speed).  
Of course this is the rhetoric, which we see as quite some distance from the 
reality, to which we now turn.     
Surprisingly, there is much evidence that, far from speeding up, the 
world is actually slowing down.  Earlier we argued that change is experienced 
at the individual level and this brings a particular methodological orientation.  
One useful basis for data collection is the well-know Stress Scale developed 
by Holmes and Rahe (1967) which scores different life events in terms of the 
stress each event is likely to cause individuals, measured in ‘life change 
units’.  The top eight ‘life events’ on this scale are: (i) death of a spouse; (ii) 
divorce; (iii) marital separation; (iv) imprisonment; (v) death of a close family 
member; (vi) personal injury or loss; (vii) marriage; and (viii) dismissal from 
work.  This suggests that we might usefully study data on death, 
divorce/marriage, crime, disease and unemployment to see how these have 
changed over the decades.  Again, we will focus exclusively on the United 
States.   
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First, data on deaths -- and death of loved ones surely has a profound 
effect on how individuals perceive change in their lives -- indicates that the 
United States, which is routinely considered the ‘hottest’ place on the planet, 
is actually ‘cooling down’.  The fact is that the rate of annual population 
change in the United States changed much more dramatically from year to 
year -- reflecting the turmoil of the period -- in the first half than in the second 
half of the twentieth century.  Over the century, the US population steadily 
increased, but what was different about the first 50 years was that there were 
quite dramatic shifts in the speed of this change, with the population dropping 
in some years while in other years there were very large increases.  The hard 
evidence is that the standard deviation on the annual population change 
between 1901 and 1950 is over three times the standard deviation of the 
annual population change between 1951 and 2000.  Put bluntly, the last fifty 
or sixty years haven’t been ravaged by the wars and pestilence of the first half 
of the twentieth century.  This is also reflected in the death rate in the US 
which showed a 38% drop in the first half of the 20th century and only a 10% 
drop in the second half, reflecting the dearth of ‘breakthrough’ medical 
research over the last sixty years, at least in contrast to earlier eras.  And 
changes in the rate of suicide -- which, following Durkheim ([1897] 1970), we 
can take as a good surrogate measure of the rate of social change -- presents 
the same picture.  While the average suicide rate in the US dropped from 13.3 
to 11.4 per 100,000 population between the first and second half of the 
twentieth century, a more striking figure is that the standard deviation in the 
first half was 2.3 times the standard deviation in the second half (reflecting 
high peaks in suicide rates from 1910 to 1920 and from 1933 to 1940).    
Divorce and marital separation rank second and third after death of a 
spouse on the Holmes and Rahe stress scale, and, notwithstanding variations 
in legal contexts, data on divorce rates over time give another useful indicator 
of change, because divorce clearly has a profound individual and social effect.  
Figure 5 plots the divorce rate in the US since 1950, which shows that the 
divorce rate in that country has steadily decreased since 1980 (interestingly, 
the rise in the divorce rate during the 1970s was contemporaneous with the 
popularisation of ‘change talk’ as exhibited in Figure 1).    
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Figure 5.  Divorce rates in the United States.  Source: US Census data. 
 
Marriage rates have also decreased over the last quarter century, but 
this has been largely offset by increasing levels of cohabitation (Bumpass et 
al., 1991).  Moreover, the median age of marriage and the proportion ever 
marrying is now about the same as it was in the late 1800s, and in this context 
the high marriage rates of the 1950s are anomalous (Popenoe, 1993).  
Imprisonment is listed as fourth on the Stress Scale, and here again the 
crime figures give no indication that the US is experiencing major or rapid 
change.  Indeed, the violent crime, homicide rate, and property crime rate 
have dropped each year since 1991 and are now similar to rates in the mid 
1970s (for violent crime) or the late 1960s (for homicide and property crime).    
Personal injury or illness is also ranked as a significant life event.  To 
represent this we have plotted (figure 6) the rate of notifiable diseases in the 
US over the last century, which shows that the present generation has 
enjoyed an extended period of rude good health, with no major disease threat 
comparable to the deadly diseases that were rampant in the first half of the 
twentieth century, .   
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Figure 6.  Prevalence of notifiable diseaseas in the US. 
  
Finally, the eight life event on the Stress Scale is ‘dismissal from work’.  
Figure 8 plots the unemployment rate since 1950 and again this indicates that 
recent decades are unremarkable.   
Figure 7.  US Unemployment Rate (1950-2005) 
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Figure 8.  US Historical Inflation Rate 
 
The inflation rate provides another indicator of economic turbulence, as 
we can reasonably assume that high levels of inflation (or deflation) or rapid 
shifts in the inflation rate reflect economic shocks experienced by individuals 
and corporations.  Figure 8 plots the US inflation rate from 1666 to 2004, 
which shows that the highest inflation rate in the period 1950 to 2000 is less 
than the highest inflation rate in any previous half-century (since 1666) and 
that this period experienced no deflation, again in contrast to all previous half-
centuries.  These periods of high inflation and deflation reflect major traumatic 
change in the lived experiences of people.  And these experiences were 
certainly turbulent in the hundred years from 1850 to 1950 which witnessed 
mass production and consumption, the development and crash of the stock 
market, the Long Depression (1873-39), the Great Depression (1929-1939), 
massive industrial change and restructuring, the communist experiment, the 
Holocaust, and more ‘isms’ than you could shake a cat at. Even the 
apparently relatively stable period of 1950-75, from the perspective of our 
current presumption, witnessed, among other things, the space race, the arms 
race, the Cold War, the Korean and Vietnam Wars, and the feminist and civil 
rights movements. While there has certainly been important economic and 
political change in recent decades, it is implausible to suggest that these 
changes are either more rapid or more profound than those experienced in 
other periods.  Even phenomena that are routinely depicted as unique to and 
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definitive of the last few decades are, on examination, better understood as 
reworkings of old logics.  For instance, Hirst and Thompson (1996) have 
presented detailed evidence that ‘globalization’ is a ‘necessary myth’ and is 
neither unprecedented nor fundamentally altering the logic of international 
commerce.  And when it comes to banking and economic crises, this time is 
certainly not different, as Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) have compelling 
demonstrated in their comprehensive historical study of such crises. 
One phenomenon missing from the Stress Scale is the effect of new 
technologies on one’s life, which is important because much of the talk about 
speed and change is implicitly or explicitly linked to the purported rapid pace 
of technological change.  However, much of this talk is maybe best 
understood as an institutionalised discourse that is founded on the reality of 
major technological change of earlier periods.  Contemporary innovations like 
the iPhone, digital video and the Internet are important, but, in a historical 
context, it is hard to see them as more important than the invention of the 
telephone, movies or the electric motor.   Indeed the first half of the twentieth 
century witnessed the unprecendented diffusion of a large number of major 
inventions that originated in the late 1800s.  For instance, the following were 
invented or discovered between 1869 and 1909 but it usually took many 
decades for their impact to be felt: the first transcontinental railroad (1869), 
polyvinylchloride (PVC) (1872), the telephone (1876), the phonograph (1877), 
the light bulb (1879), the cholera vaccine (1880), the first electric power 
station (1882), the motorcycle (1885), the gasoline-powered automobile 
(1885), radio waves (1888), pneumatic tyre (1888), the punch-card computer 
(1889), photographic film (1889), x-rays (1895), wireless telegraphy (1895), 
A/C current (1895), radioactivity (1896), air conditioning (1902), the airplane 
(1903), the vacuum tube diode (1904), the electron (1904), helicopter (1907), 
and the Model T automobile (1908).   What is passing for significant change 
today is not particularly novel and indeed many contemporary innovations 
were actually seeded by the Second Industrial Revolution, which is still 
playing itself out.  Returning to Heraclitus, it is clear that change is, was and 
always will be a feature of the human condition and the cosmos.  We need 
only think for a while about what life was like for those people who lived during 
the colonization of the Americas, the Reformation, the Renaissance, or the 
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(extended) fall of the Roman Empire. It is this historical context that compels 
us to posit the contrarian position that we live in a period of relative inertia. 
Moreover, just because previous generations lived through a period of rapid 
change, this is no guarantee that our society or future ones will do likewise, 
however much we might like to live in interesting times.  In short, our world 
isn’t particularly ‘hot’ or fast at all. It’s just we talk as if it is.  
To explain the enduring divergence between the rhetoric and the reality, 
we first return to the discussion of fashion that we briefly introduced earlier. 
And, in the spirit of slowness, we take a cool and leisurely stroll through 
contemporary readings to return to some of the original inspiration. We begin 
with Abrahamson’s (1996) piece in the Academy of Management Review. 
After first attributing to Sapir (1937) the insight that ‘fashions gratify competing 
psychological drives for individuality and novelty, on the one hand, and 
conformity and traditionalism, on the other’ (Abrahamson, 1996: 271), he 
moves on to Simmel’s (1957) ‘more sociological explanation’, which 
apparently ‘suggests that fashions serve not only to reveal who is in fashion, 
but also to distinguish high-status from low-status individuals’ …  ‘Proposition 
6: New management fashions will tend to emerge when old management 
fashions have been adopted by lower reputation organizations’ (1996: 272, 
original italicisation). The writings of Georg Simmel are without doubt amongst 
the most subtle and insightful - and the most resistant to simple static 
interpretation - that one is ever likely to have the pleasure to read. They stand 
head and shoulders above those of the majority of not only his 
contemporaries but also his predecessors and successors. They are, quite 
simply, an enduring delight. It is somewhat discomfiting to find such a barren 
reading in what is one of the most widely cited articles on management 
fashion. And this is not unique to Abrahamson, of course. 
Simmel’s reflections on the process of fashion were first published in 
1904 and in 16 pages of text, without a single full reference, remain as close 
as one is ever likely to get to the last word on a subject. Simmel shows the 
ways in which distinction and indistinction are always co-implicated as they 
act as each other’s motors and brakes. Simmel situates fashion in the 
broadest possible terms, beginning, as in much of his work, with an 
articulation of an unceasing, de-centred, dialectic to apprehend our (social) 
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world of ‘two antagonistic forces, tendencies, or characteristics, either of 
which, if left unaffected, would approach infinity’ (1904/1971: 130). Such 
apprehension is essential for Simmel if we are to fully realise our potential: 
Human life cannot hope to develop a wealth of inexhaustible possibilities until we 
come to recognize in every moment and content of existence a pair of forces, each one 
of which, in striving to go beyond the initial point, has resolved the infinity of the 
other by mutual impingement into mere tension and desire. (130) 
 
The whole history of society is reflected in the striking conflicts, the compromises, 
slowly won and quickly lost, between socialistic adaptation to society and individual 
departure from its demands […] Each in its sphere attempts to combine the interest in 
duration, unity and similarity with that in change, specialization, and peculiarity. It 
becomes self-evident that there is no institution, no law, no estate of life, which can 
uniformly satisfy the full demands of the two opposing principles. The only realization 
of this condition possible for humanity finds its expression in constantly changing 
approximations, in ever retracted attempts and ever revived hopes. It is that that 
constitutes the whole wealth of our development, the whole incentive to advancement, 
the possibility of grasping a vast proportion of all the infinite combinations of the 
elements of human character, a proportion that is approaching the unlimited itself. 
(131 – 2) 
 
The ceaseless movement of fashion thus appears as an exemplary case 
of the deferral and extension of the vicissitudes of human life – ‘the 
continuous movement that characterizes all aspects of human existence’ 
(Cooper, 2008: 1); the ability to affect and be affected as an inherently social 
being whose identity, as entity, is always and forever only momentarily 
grasped as it is motivated to exceed itself by the simultaneously shifting 
context from which it is forever wrested in a congenitally failing and thus 
ongoing process.  
[T]here is good reason why externals – clothing, social conduct, amusements – 
constitute the specific field of fashion, for here no dependence is place on really vital 
motives of human action. It is the field which we can most easily relinquish to the bent 
towards imitation, which it would be a sin to follow in important questions. 
 
Yet designation of a phenomenon or approach thereto as sinful does not 
in itself delegitimate that phenomenon or one’s approach to it sufficiently to 
make the sin impossible or even unlikely. For as Simmel also notes, ‘the 
whole style of human expression’ is ‘constantly transformed by fashion’; and 
ideas about appropriate and effective management techniques and practices, 
if they are to be communicated, must of course be expressed, and expressed 
by humans. Indeed, Simmel is crystal clear that fashionableness in itself 
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provides no direct indictment of an object, practice or process. Rather the 
notion of fashion must be transformed, generally through construction of a 
more positive foil – primarily the utile for the futile in the case of a practice so 
practical as management – if it is to function effectively as a term of 
opprobrium. 
[A]n object does not suffer degradation by being called fashionable, unless we reject 
it with disgust or wish to de-base it for other, material reasons, in which case, of 
course, fashion becomes an idea of value (1904/1971: 139) 
 
Despite the risk of fashion becoming a (negative) ideal of value, humans, 
in their human expression, are most likely to be drawn to its virtues and seek 
its display when their (privileged) current status is at risk: ‘Segregation by 
means of differences […] is expedient only where the danger of absorption 
and obliteration exists’ (Simmel, 1904/1971: 137) justified on the basis of a 
world seen to be experiencing an ever increasing rate of change in and of its 
nature (Grey, 2003; Kavanagh et al, 2007). 
[T]he more nervous the age, the more rapidly its fashions change, simply because the 
desire for differentiation, one of the most important elements of all fashion, goes hand 
in hand with the weakening of nervous energy. This fact in itself is one of the reasons 
why the real seat of fashion is found among the upper classes (Simmel, 
1904/1971:138). 
 
The real variability of historical life is… vested in the middle classes, and for this 
reason the history of social and cultural movements has fallen into an entirely 
different pace since the tiers êtat assumed control… Classes and individuals who 
demand constant change, because the rapidity of their development gives them the 
advantage over others, find in fashion something that keeps pace with their own soul-
movements. Social advance above all is favorable to the rapid change of fashion, for 
it capacitates lower classes so much for imitation of upper ones, and thus the 
process… according to which every higher set throws aside a fashion the moment a 
lower set adopts it, has acquired a breadth and activity never dreamed of before 
(Simmel, 1904/1971: 151) 
 
And it is this sense too that fashion is also inevitably timely in its thrall. 
For what is at stake is the perpetuation of distinction and its attendant 
privileges in the face of the endless degeneration of the prior grounds on 
which they depended and their re-establishment through the fickle friend of 
novelty and the pseudo-stability of a ceaseless procession of the new (and, by 
implication, better): 
[L]ife according to fashion consists of a balancing of destruction and upbuilding; its 
content acquires characteristics by destruction of an earlier form; it possesses a 
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peculiar uniformity, in which the satisfying of the love of destruction and of the 
demand for positive elements can no longer be separated from each other (Simmel, 
1904/1971: 142) 
 
Fashion always occupies the dividing-line between the past and the future, and 
consequently conveys a stronger feeling of the present, at least while it is at its height, 
than most other phenomena. (Simmel, 1904/1971: 139) 
 
The break with the past, which, for more than a century [remember we are here in 
1904], civilized mankind has been laboring unceasingly to bring about, makes the 
consciousness turn more and more to the present. This accentuation of the present at 
the same time emphasisizes the element of change, and a class will turn to fashion in 
all fields, by no means only in that of apparel, in proportion to the degree to which it 
supports the given civilizing tendency. It may almost be considered a sign of the 
increased power of fashion, that it has overstepped the bounds of its original domain, 
which comprised only personal externals, and has acquired an increasing influence 
over taste, over theoretical convictions, and even over the moral foundations of life 
(139 - 40) 
 
In making its presence so central to our times fashion becomes imperial 
in its reach, becoming an obligatory passage point that must be traversed by 
all, regardless of whether they seek to stand with fashion or against it. And 
once we are within this empire, what happens when we are confronted by 
strangeness without? Marshal Sahlins tells a captivating story of how the 
South Sea Islanders (a supposedly ‘cold’ or static cultural system in Lévi-
Strauss’s terms) absorbed their initial engagement with European adventurers 
(representatives of a ‘hot’ culture) through the islanders’ existing concepts and 
categories. Importantly, the meetings actually reinforced these categories, in 
that the Hawaiians perceived Captain Cook as a reapparance of their Year 
God, Lono, and was thus “a tradition for Hawaiians before he was a fact” 
(Sahlins, 1985/1987: 148).  Thus the cold culture stayed cold by interpreting 
and incorporating ‘evidence’ from the hot culture within their world view.  
Indeed this is Kuhn’s wider point about paradigms: evidence that questions or 
contradicts a paradigm is either ignored or, more potently, assimilated into the 
paradigm, which is strengthened through the process.  This leads us to the 
challenging idea that maybe the world is actually slowing down, but the 
paradigm within which we live cannot accept this.  Just as the South Sea 
Islanders interpreted Captain Cook as part of their pantheon -- and thus 
stayed ‘cold’ -- maybe we believe we live in a ‘hot’ culture and so dismiss or 
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re-interpret any evidence of ‘coldness’ so that our belief is not compromised.  
This, centrally, is the idea of accelerating to inertia.  On the one hand we talk 
about speed -- and speed on top of speed, or acceleration -- while our lived 
experience is one of relative inertia.  Change is a constant, but, as Gandhi 
gently reminded us, ‘there is more to life than increasing its speed’.   
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